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A NEW PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM OF
COMMERCIAL AIR CRASH LITIGATION
By ANDREW J. CHALK*
I. INTRODUCTION
IN RECENT YEARS the tort litigation of major commer-
ilcial air crashes has been one of the most controversial
issues in the field of air law. The existing system has been
called "outmoded, anachronistic and frequently unwork-
able"' and "the tortured, torturous, even torturing tort
system ' 2 by prominent practitioners. Although the sys-
tem's problems are many, its two most serious are the in-
consistent treatment that the system of multiple state laws
gives to victims from different jurisdictions and the pro-
tracted delay from the time of loss until judgment. These
problems, among others, account for the flurry of propos-
als for reform from academics and practitioners alike.3
* Assistant Professor of Finance, Southern Methodist University. The Univer-
sity of Warwick (Economics), M.A., Ph.D. (Economics), Washington University,
1983. I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Mark Dombroff and
the Editors of the Journal.
Kennelly, Litigation Implications of the Chicago O'Hare Airport Crash of American
Airlines Flight 191, 15 J. MAR. L. REV. 273, 276 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Kennelly].
2 J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY - No FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS
AND SERVICES 67 (1975) [hereinafter cited as O'CONNELL].
3 See generally id. See also Kennelly, supra note 1; Milford, A No-Fault Aviation In-
surance Plan, 41J. AIR L. & CoM. 211 (1975); Kennedy, Accidents in Commercial Air
Transportation - A Proposed Reform of the Liability and Compensation System, 41 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 247 (1975); Schmidt, Ince & Richbourg, Piercing the Aluminum Overcast: A
Case for Strict Liability for Commercial Air Carriers, 9 LINCOLN L. REV. 37 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as Schmidt]; Corrigan, From A To B - The Aviation Industry's Responsibil-
ity to Passengers, 34 J. AIR L. & COM. 506 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Corrigan];
Note, Domestic Commercial Aircraft Tort Litigation: A Proposalfor Absolute Liability of the
Carriers, 23 STAN. L. REV. 569 (1971).
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The more modest of these proposals advocate the adop-
tion of uniform legislation 4 or the imposition of strict lia-
bility on the carriers. 5 The more radical proposals
advocate the replacement of the tort system with some
kind of no-fault plan.'
This paper is another proposal, which I shall term the
market insurance plan, for the reform of air carrier litigation,
but the plan proposed in this paper is of a very different
character from those suggested hitherto. It may be con-
sidered as radical as the O'Connell no-fault plan,7 and it is
somewhat similar in operation. Like the O'Connell plan,
this proposal assures speedy compensation of the victim
and uniformity of application. However, it differs from
no-fault proposals, and has more in common with an
"ideal" tort system, in that it fully compensates the victim
and provides deterrence. The reason that the market in-
surance plan has not received wide discussion until now is
that it is derived from new evidence which challenges
some traditional assumptions about air carrier safety.
Specifically, this paper presents results from recent re-
search8 that cast doubt on the reasonableness of a system
of recovery that takes years to compensate accident vic-
tims. The evidence further suggests that the compromise
to the conflicting purposes of compensation and deter-
rence represented by no-fault insurance is not the best al-
ternative. The rapid recovery permitted by no-fault
4 See, e.g., Kennelly, supra note 1; Corrigan, supra note 3.
See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 3; Note, supra note 3.
6 See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL, supra note 2; Milford, supra note 3.
7 Under the O'Connell plan, legislation would permit a firm to elect no-fault
coverage for some or all types of accidents associated with its products. The firm
could specify not only the type of accidents covered by no-fault but also limit the
geographic distribution of no-fault coverage for certain types of accidents. Con-
sumers could not "elect out" (i.e., bring suit for damages), except in the case of
intentionally caused injuries. The whole plan would be regulated by an insurance
commissioner who would presumably approve the level of coverage provided.
8 See A. Chalk, Producer Reputation and the Regulation of Airline Safety (1983)
(unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as Producer Reputation]. See also A.
Chalk, Market Forces and Aircraft Safety: The Case of the DC-10 (1983) (unpub-
lished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as Market Forces].
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insurance 9 can be achieved with the deterrence created by
tort liability. An attraction of the insurance plan is its flex-
ibility. Although this paper proposes one form of the
market insurance plan, the minute details are not dis-
cussed because they can be designed to address problems
peculiar to particular types of accidents. This paper em-
phasizes the key features of the market insurance plan and
gives their rationale; it is up to individual legislators to
tailor the details to fit special circumstances.
Section II of this paper describes the economic frame-
work for the analysis of product safety. The principal
finding is that the choice of optimal legal structures for
the regulation of product safety depends on the state of
consumer information about product hazards. If product
hazards are known with certainty, then the unregulated
market will provide the optimal amount of safety. How-
ever, if consumers are completely ignorant of product
hazards, then strict liability results in higher consumer
welfare than caveat emptor.10 The empirical evidence
presented in Section III bears directly on the state of in-
formation available to air carrier consumers. This evi-
dence shows that the assumption underpinning all
existing aviation accident proposals, that consumers are
ignorant of hazards, is incorrect. It is this new finding
that jusitifies the market insurance plan outlined in Sec-
tion IV.
II. AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS
The economic analysis of tort liability systems can be
9 Since no-fault plans specify the compensation awarded for particular types of
injury in advance of the consumer's participation in the activity and do not make
such compensation contingent on anything more than proof of injury, the only
delay in compensating the plaintiff is the time necessary to prove the injury was
associated with the product.
10 Literally, "let the buyer beware". BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed.
1979). However, the term is used in economics to describe some approximation
to a free market. In the context above, the term implies that accident costs stay on
the party who initially bears them unless the parties voluntarily contract to shift the
burden via compensation of the injured.
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traced back to the 1972 work of Demsetz,' who applied
the more general analysis of Coase.1 2 Economic analysis
treats accidents, for analytical purposes, as involuntary in-
teractions between people that entail a loss to one of the
parties.' 3 As such, the social cost of accidents is the sum
of all losses plus prevention activities.' 4 The assignment
of liability is the decision whether to leave the loss on the
victim or to transfer some or all of the loss to the injurer.
Different liability assignments can have different implica-
tions for the size of accident costs. 15
Assume, for example, that consumers are fully aware
that they can easily injure a hand in the course of using a
knife for its legitimate purpose of chopping vegetables.
Assume that the law imposes only one of two polar liabil-
ity standards on kitchen knives: strict producer liability
or no producer liability. If the law assigns liability to pro-
ducers, then knife producers will take all precautions that
reduce their liability cost by more than the cost of the pre-
' Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1J. LEG. STUD. 13 (1972).
12 See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J. LAw AND ECON. 1 (1960). This classic
article is widely regarded as the piece of scholarship that established economic
analysis of law. Coase proved the theorem that the allocation of resources to pro-
ductive activity is independent of the initial assignment of property rights so long
as economic agents can bargain without transaction costs. Given the assumption
of costless transactions, economic agents will always allocate resources in a way
that achieves production in the least costly manner, even if the initial allocation is
cost inefficient. The importance of the Coase theorem in the economic analysis
of law is exemplified by R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (2d ed. 1977).
1- It is difficult in practice to value the losses suffered by the injured, but it is a
useful analytical tool to ignore these problems for the present and assume that the
plaintiff's loss can be immediately and precisely measured at some dollar amount.
Later, this assumption is relaxed. See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
14 The terms have the following definitions:
L = dollar amount of plaintiffs loss per accident.
Cp = dollar amount spent on safety precautions by plaintiff per year
Cd = dollar amount spent on safety precautions by defendant per
year.
N = number of accidents per year.
The social cost of accidents per year is: A = NL + Cp + Cd (i.e., the sum of
accident and accident prevention costs). This simplification of the problem em-
phasizes that the cost of accidents born by society as a whole is not limited to
plaintiff losses. Resources used in prevention (Cp + Cd) and L are all likely to be
under the control of one or both of the parties to an accident, and not exogenous.
15 Id.
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cautions. Remaining injuries will be compensated out of
revenues from the sale of kitchen knives, financed by rais-
ing the price above the cost of production by enough to
fund this compulsory insurance policy. Consumers will
theoretically take no care, assuming the law fully compen-
sates them for the cost of accidents. In the case of no pro-
ducer liability, consumers will take all cost-justified
precautions and bear the cost of or insure against injuries
that are too costly to prevent. Producers will provide
safety precautions to the extent that consumers are willing
to pay the producers' costs of production.
The economic difference between these liability stan-
dards is the different cost that each imposes on society.
Because consumers may be better able to take safety pre-
cautions in their use of kitchen knives than producers can
in their design, the costs of accidents will differ with liabil-
ity. Oi' 6 has proven that the efficient17 standard under
perfect consumer information'" is no liability. 19 In such a
scenario consumers would induce producers to take care
through the marketplace, rewarding manufacturers of
products with desirable risk characteristics and penalizing
those who manufacture products that are too risky, or not
risky enough, given the product's price. The imposition
of strict liability in a marketplace with perfect information
reduces consumer welfare by eliminating desired prod-
16 Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 BELL. J. EcoN. 3 (1973).
17 Efficiency, in economics, has the technical meaning of attaining an allocation
of resources that maximizes social welfare. See generally J. HIRSCHLEIFER, PRICE
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (2d. 1980)."
18 Perfect consumer information means that consumers know exactly the size of
the loss, L, if an accident occurs, and the probability, p, of a loss for every level of
care. Perfect consumer information is an abstraction which establishes sufficient
conditions for this conclusion. Perfect information may not be necessary for the
result. For example, there are occasions when consumers use kitchen knives with
which they are not perfectly familiar, and therefore expose themselves to imper-
fectly known hazards. Nevertheless, the perfect information abstraction is the
closest approximation to the true state of consumer information.
'9 A standard of no liability will induce the optimal amount of care at the least
cost. Under the perfect information theory, consumers take the optimal amount
of care, Cp, and purchase products that have the optimal amount of safety built in,
Cd, so as to minimize total accident costs A. See supra note 14.
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ucts from the market.
20
The situation of imperfect consumer information 2' is
more troublesome. To keep the problem traceable, con-
sider the worst case scenario of complete consumer igno-
rance of all product hazards. Producers are assumed to
be perfectly informed about product hazards but unable
to communicate this information to consumers. If the
courts establish a no-producer-liability standard, then ig-
norant consumers, believing that a product is safe, will
take no care and will not pay a higher price to producers
to cover the costs of manufacturing less hazardous prod-
ucts.2 2 As a result, no care is taken by either party -
clearly a suboptimal outcome. In this situation of com-
plete consumer ignorance, strict producer liability is supe-
rior to no liability. Strict producer liability reduces the
social cost of accidents by creating producer incentives to
- There is an important exception to the superiority of no liability over strict
liability. If courts honor exculpatory clauses, then the allocative effects of the two
rules are identical and there is no economic reason to prefer no liability over strict
liability. This is an application of the Coase Theorem, which states that, given
zero transaction costs, the initial allocation of property rights is irrelevant to the
final allocative outcome. See Coase, supra note 12. In the products liablity con-
text, it is the law's refusal to honor exculpatory clauses that creates high transac-
tions costs, thus invalidating the irrelevance of the initial allocation of property
rights (liability). Id.
21 Imperfect consumer information is the opposite analytical assumption of per-
fect consumer information. Consumers improperly estimate accident losses, L, or
the probability of an accident, p. See supra note 14. The legal literature generally
assumes that if consumer information is imperfect, then consumers underestimate
L and/or p. See, e.g., Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability,
69 CALIF. L. REV. 919 (1981); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection:
Doctrine, Function, and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109
(1974). Although the underestimation case is important, the social cost of im-
properly estimating p and L is symmetrical - overestimation of the hazards asso-
ciated with a product is also socially costly. Furthermore, there are cases in which
consumers may systematically overestimate product hazards. For example, if one
brand of a product is associated with injury, consumers may attribute the same
hazards to other brands of the same product. There is some evidence that this
occurred when research associated Proctor and Gamble's Rely tampon with toxic
shock syndrome. See Laboratory Evidence Linking Toxic Shock to Tampons is Found,
Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
22 Stating that consumers will take no care is again a simplification made for
analytical convenience. The important point is that, in real-world situations, con-
sumers underinvest in care.
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take care.23
Although this example involves products liability, the
analysis is equally applicable to tort claims, such as the
personal injury and wrongful death actions so prominent
in commercial air crash litigation. Put differently, the
state of consumer information is as relevant to the effi-
cient determination of liability in air crash accidents as it
is in products liability cases.
The existing proposals for the reform of the aviation
tort liability system2 4 all share the same assumption that
consumers are ignorant of the risks of airline or air crash
hazards. This assumption leads to the erroneous conclu-
sion that airline consumers are incapable of imposing the
market discipline necessary for a no-producer-liability sys-
tem to operate efficiently. Far from being unique to re-
form advocates, this consumer ignorance conclusion is
the most prevalent view in public policy discussions of
commercial air carrier safety. 25 If this assumption of con-
sumer ignorance is accepted, then strict producer liabil-
2 An example would be the safety of nuclear electricity generation. Electricity
consumers are generally ignorant of the operation of a nuclear power plant,
whereas utilities have accurate knowledge. Hence, strict liability on utilities
would be the appropriate standard.
24 See supra note 3.
25 Consumer ignorance underpins the rationale for the federal agency with spe-
cific responsibility for air safety, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). See
A. CHALK, THE ECONOMICS OF AIRLINE SAFETY, ch. 3 (1983) (available through
University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan); Comment, The Crashworthiness Doc-
trine and the Allocation of Risks in Commercial Aviation, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Comment]. The following comment is typical of proponents
of the market failure view:
The potential influence [of consumers on air safety], however, is not
great because passengers lack both the opportunity and the knowl-
edge to provide effective input into the design of a commercial air-
liner. . . . Even if passengers had an opportunity to express a
preference for more crashworthy aircraft, most of them lack the
knowledge to do so. Many would not perceive the possibility of the
plane's design causing deaths and injuries after the crash had oc-
curred. And if a passenger did recognize a potential problem, it is
unlikely that he would have the engineering knowledge that would
be necessary to determine whether the plane's design did, in fact,
create an unreasonable risk of second collision deaths and injuries.
Comment, supra at 1609-10. As a result, "the market for air travel is unlikely to
affect the amount of crashworthiness that is produced because consumers of air
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ity should govern air carrier activities because consumers
do not know the risks of air travel and take no care to
insure against these risks. Imposing strict liability reduces
the social costs of accidents by inducing producers to take
care. The rationale for a no-producer fault-liability is less
direct, but similarly assumes that the market does not
function efficiently.
The striking aspect of the assumption that the market
fails to provide air safety is that it does not rest on any
empirical evidence. Certainly, individual instances of in-
adequate safety provision are cited in the literature,26 but
these cases could be unrepresentative of normal market
responses. This "market failure" view appears to rest on
the assumption that the highly complex technology of
commercial aviation is beyond the ordinary consumer's
comprehension. 7 Therefore, consumers are incapable of
monitoring the amount of care provided by air carriers or
aircraft manufacturers.
A different implication, however, may be drawn from
this information problem. The "market response" view
of air carrier safety asserts that the inability of consumers
to measure the input to safety will lead consumers to sub-
stitute the measurement of output. Specifically, observa-
ble signals attesting to the safety of existing products
become the basis for expectations about the safety offu-
ture products. There is a growing body of economic litera-
ture concerning the operation of such a "reputation" or
"brand name" effect. 8 An interesting conclusion of that
literature is that although a loss of reputation occurs ex
post,2 9 the threat of this loss of reputation provides incen-
travel generally lack the opportunity and the knowledge to assess the crashworthi-
ness of commercial airlines." Id. at 1617.
26 See, e.g., Kreindler, Our Tort System and Aviation Safety, 34J. AIR L. & CoM. 497,
503 (1968).
27 See Comment, supra note 25, at 1609-10.
28 See, e.g., Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Reputa-
tion and Product Quality 14 BELLJ. EcON. 508 (1983); Heal, Do Bad Products Drive Out
Good?, 90 Q J. EcoN. 499 (1976).




tives for producers to manufacture safe products ex ante.30
Thus, no product failures need occur for this mechanism
to efficiently assure product safety. In this respect reputa-
tion is similar to a bonding arrangement in which the
bond is posted up front and forfeited if the party fails to
perform the specified terms of the agreement.
There are numerous examples of products whose brand
name connotes a certain level of quality aimed at a specific
market segment."' But is the reputation mechanism effec-
tive in commercial aviation? The market response view,
like the market failure view, has remained an untested -
hypothesis.
The next section explains and reports a critical test be-
tween these two views. It suggests that an observable sig-
nal of safety used by consumers is the public information
revealed in aircraft accidents. Consumer responses will
ultimately be reflected in the wealth of the owners of the
firms that produce suspect aircraft. We can thus measure
the size of the reputation effect by the change in the mar-
ket value of the firm's stock.
III. MEASURING CONSUMER DEMAND FOR SAFETY
This section proposes a test of the validity of the market
failure hypothesis3 2 and the market response hypothesis.
Specifically, the "market response" hypothesis asserts
that although aviation is too complex for consumers to
master all the technical details, consumers can react to the
safety information revealed by a crash. Consumers re-
spond to negative safety information by substituting dif-
ferent airlines or makes of plane, for the apparently
unsafe airline or plane make.
In cases in which the type of plane is at issue, this re-
so This is to say that, knowing the potential costs of an accident to the firm,
producers take safety precautions in advance to prevent accidents from occurring.
31 Everyday examples that come to mind are the value of the department store
name on the products it sells, Kodak paper for the printing of color pictures, and
the IBM name in the personal computer market.
32 The "market failure" hypothesis is discussed supra at notes 24-28 and accom-
panying text.
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sponse can lead to reduced airline demand for the plane
in the future. This paper consolidates results from the ec-
onomics literature 33 in a form designed to emphasize their
relevance to air crash litigation. Technical details are con-
fined to the appendix. The purpose of the tests is to show
that there is a consumer response to air crashes in which a
design flaw of the aircraft may have contributed to the
crash. Furthermore, the methodology also generates a
point estimate of the size of this effect.
Economic theory suggests that if consumers cannot as-
certain the quality of goods or services by pre-purchase
inspection, then they may form expectations of quality
based on the producer's reputation. 4 A reputation for
quality, in this case safety, is an asset to the firm. That is,
it is something of value to shareholders of the firm that
they acquire when they purchase shares, and dispose of
when they sell their shares. The market response view
suggests that if reputation is important in the passenger
aircraft market, then the aircraft manufacturer's reputa-
tion will be decreased (i.e., depreciated in the economic
'sense of the term) when consumers receive information
that a certain type of airplane is less safe than previously
believed. As a result, the value of the firm to its owners
decreases, as manifested by a decrease in the stock price.
The tests conducted here use a stock price model from
modern finance theory to detect and measure this stock
price effect.
The first study"5 used a sample of 72 fatal accidents that
comprised all Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed
crashes in the United States between 1966 and 1979.36
13 See A. Chalk, Producer Reputation, and A.Chalk, Market Forces, supra note 8.
' See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
3- A. Chalk, Producer Reputation, supra note 8.
6 The study used contemporaneous news reports from The New York Times to
establish whether the immediate events surrounding the crash suggested that the
manufacturer was culpable, or that the crash was attributable to airline, environ-
mental or air traffic control factors. It is not the eventual National Transportation
Safety Board or court determination that is at issue, but consumer expectations at
the time of the crash.
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This sample of 72 accidents was split into two subsamples
of "suspect" (manufacturer culpable) and "control"
(other cause) crashes, thus allowing a comparison be-
tween the two types of crashes to account for any stock
price effect common to all crashes. A model of manufac-
turer stock returns was estimated over a period preceding
each crash 37 and used to predict returns over the 30-day
period consisting of the crash and the following 29 days.
If a crash has no effect on stock performance, then the
forecast errors from the model are random fluctuations
around zero. However, if the reputation effect operates,
the firm's stock price will fall as news of the accident
reaches the stock market. Stock price effects for each
crash are averaged across all crashes in both the control
sample and the suspect sample to generalize to results
that are valid for the average crash, rather than a special
case.
38
37 The technical details of the estimation and prediction of the stock market
model are given in the appendix.
38 The result for the suspect crashes is statistically significant at greater than the
1% level (one-tailed test). The control group result is statistically insignificant at
any conventional significance level.
2291985]
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Figure 1 plots the cumulative forecast errors for the two
subsamples against time. Day 0, on the horizontal axis, is
the day of the crash and subsequent stock trading days are
marked in intervals of two. Figure 1 shows that the mean
forecast error on the day was -1.62% for the decrease in
the stock price of the manufacturer relative to the predic-
tion of the model.3 9
Subsequent days indicate generally insignificant fore-
cast errors, suggesting that there was no later effect and
that the initial negative impact on the suspect firm's stock
price was not eradicated in subsequent trading.40 The
second conclusion to be drawn from Figure 1 is that the
performance of the suspect group is different from the
performance of the control group. The cumulative fore-
cast errors for the control group are insignificant through-
out the prediction period. In particular, there is no
evidence of negative abnormal performance on the day of
the crash. Taken together, the results of these two sam-
ples reject the hypothesis that there is no market response
to aircraft accidents and are consistent with the hypothesis
that accidents reveal information to consumers through
the depreciation of a suspect manufacturer's reputation.
To transform the fall in a suspect manufacturer's stock
price into the dollar decrease in the value of the firm's
equity, multiply the price change by the numer of out-
standing shares. This procedure applied to the data in
Figure 1 yields an average decrease in market value of
$57,000,000. 4 1
3 This is the mean stock market response from a sample in which some crashes
showed smaller responses and others much larger responses.
40 The forecast errors for days 1 and 2 are -0.95% and -1.12% respectively and
each is statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level in a one-tailed
test. This post-crash date negative stock performance may be due to further bad
news or a failure to correctly "time" the result that news reached the stock market.
For example, if an accident occurred at 2:15 p.m. Eastern time, is it correct to
assume that news reached the stock market that trading day, or was the news car-
ried by the wire services after the market's 4:00 p.m. close?
- Not all of this amount can be explained by the legal costs of accidents. There
has never been a successful punitive damages suit against a commercial airplane
builder, so the large components of legal costs are insured. Any change in the
stock price results from a change in expectations, such as a change in insurance
1985] 231
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Reputation effects can be much larger than the mean
value, as in the case of the May 25, 1979, Chicago DC-10
crash.4 2 It was widely believed at the time that the intrin-
sic design of the aircraft was to blame. As one observer
stated:
The apparent structural failure of a modern jetliner
caused reverberations throughout the world. Hundreds of
DC-10s carrying thousands of passengers were being
flown millions of miles each day by scores of domestic and
international airlines. The accident took place in normal
weather. There could be no contention of low level wind
shear, vortex turbulence, sabotage or any other outside
cause.
43
Twelve days after the accident the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) reinforced this initial impression when
it took the unprecedented step of grounding the DC-10
by withdrawing its type certificate.44 Although it was later
discovered that improper maintenance was the proximate
cause of the accident and the plane's design was only a
contributing factor,4 5 the DC-10 planes remained
grounded for a total of five weeks. If reputation effects
are operative, then this is the case in which they should be
most apparent.
premiums. Estimates of the size of this, in present value terms, vary from $0 to
$33 million. See A. Chalk, Producer Reputation, supra note 8.
42 In this accident, the No. 1 engine fell from the wing of the plane at low alti-
tude (1,000 feet) in clear weather as the plane was taking off. See The Worst U.S.
Crash, TIME, June 4, 1979.
43 Kennelly, supra note 1.
44 See FAA Suspends Design Certification, Grounds DC-JO's, Prompting a Dispute Over
Cause of Plane's Problems, Wall St. J. June 7, 1979, at 2, col. 2.
4- National Transportation Safety Board, Aircraft Accident Report: American
Airlines, Inc., DC-10-10, Ni1AA, Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, Chi-
cago, Illinois, May 25, 1979 (1979).
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The results in this case are much more dramatic than in
the previous case. Figure 2 and Table 1 show the signifi-
cant events from the date of the crash until 60 days there-
after. Note that the forecast errors of the model are much
larger in magnitude than the mean forecast error in the
large sample. The forecast errors are statistically signifi-
cant, and have the correct coefficient in virtually every
case.4 6 At its lowest point, June 7, the day after the an-
nouncement of the grounding, McDonnell Douglas ex-
perienced a cumulative forecast error of -33% since the
crash. This amounted to a decrease of $350,000,000 in
the market value of McDonnell Douglas stock. The mar-
ket value of McDonnell Douglas stock subsequently recov-
ered when it was announced that improper maintenance
was the major cause of the accident; the loss in market
value had shrunk to $157,000,000 by July 13.
These results dramatically reject the hypothesis of no
market response and are consistent with the alternative
hypothesis of a negative reputation effect. The decrease
in the stock price measures the reduction in owner wealth
and, although the stock market is the place of measure-
ment, this is a reflection of changes in the product mar-
ket.47 These results cannot show that the information
conveyed to the public through aircraft accident publicity
is sufficient for the market to adjust completely, but the
results do indicate that the traditional assumption of com-
plete market failure is misguided.
This evidence of consumer information responses has
immediate implications for products liability law and the
reform proposals cited earlier.48  The optimal liability
rule49 depends on the rate of consumer information.
416 The lone exception is Tuesday, June 5.
47 This is an implication of economic theory's assumption of stockholder wealth
maximization. If aircraft accidents did not cause a product market impact, then no
wealth impact would result and there would be no reason for investors to revalue
stock prices downwards. See generally T. COPELAND & F. WESTON, FINANCIAL THE-
ORY AND CORPORATE POLICY (2d. ed. 1983).
48 See supra notes 3, 7 and accompanying text.
49 See supra notes 12-30 and accompaning text.
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Wrongful death and personal injury cases in aircraft acci-
dents are litigated under a negligence standard that al-
most invariably leads to the plaintiff's recovery from one
or more of the defendants." The alleged absence of con-
sumer information argued against the transfer of any lia-
bility to the plaintiff, or, equivalently, that the market can
solve aircraft safety problems unassisted. However, the
data presented above is the first systematic evidence to
bear directly on the issue of airline consumer responses
and it indicates that the assumption of complete con-
sumer ignorance is false. Alternative legal approaches are
now up for consideration as better, even if not ideal, ways
to deal with the losses from commercial airplane
accidents.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT LITIGATION - THE MARKET
INSURANCE PLAN
A. Procedural Aspects
The present system should be replaced with an insur-
ance-based system which allows each consumer to deter-
mine his desired level of coverage and purchase insurance
up to that amount. In the event of a fatal crash, the in-
surer would remit the insured amount to the beneficiaries
named in the policy. Insurance policies would be sold by
commercial insurance companies on the same basis as
• other lines of insurance. 51 The insurance rates, or cost
per dollar of coverage, would be set to reflect the risks
involved. The involved risks would depend on the
amount of flying done by the insured, the carrier and the
type of aircraft flown.
Travel insurance is either implicitly or explicitly- part of
so See generally J. KENNELLY, THE LITIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH CASES
(1968).
51 Not only would the administrative aspects of the market insurance plan be
virtually identical to such other major lines as life, auto and fire insurance, but
insurers are already heavily involved in various types of travel-related insurance.
See D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 534-563 (10th ed. 1979).
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the total cost of air travel to the consumer. Suppliers of
air travel services, carriers and manufacturers could be ex-
pected to minimize insurance costs by taking all precau-
tions that cost less than the insurance rate. 2 Suppliers
can do this more effectively by permitting insurers' risk
assessors to perform inspections and examinations of
their facilities and safety practices, as is commonly done in
other areas of insurance.53 In effect, the insurance com-
pany monitors safety for consumers. Insurers' policies
would state rates per miles traveled or departures taken54
for each carrier or aircraft type, and the publicity given to
these "tariffs" would alter consumers' purchase decisions
towards safer suppliers. This increases the safety incen-
tives of less safe carriers. Less safe carriers must either
become sufficiently safe to be competitive or be economi-
cally forced out of business.
The consumer could choose insurance either at the air-
port, where insurance agents and the airline itself may of-
fer contracts for specific flights, or in advance for a set
period of time, possibly as part of a general life insurance
policy. Consumers themselves could explicitly weigh the
costs and benefits of greater safety, rather than being
forced to buy an air carrier's insurance policy as a tied-in
product.55
52 See Rothchild & Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay
on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629 (1976) for a more com-
plete explanation of this point.
" This willingness of suppliers to voluntarily submit to insurers' inspection ac-
tivities is an example of a bonding arrangement, as described for financial markets
in Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305, 323 (1976).
Departures taken may be a better measure of risk than miles traveled, since
the risk of an aircraft accident is not independent of the state of flight. In fact, fifty
percent of all aircraft accidents occur during takeoff or landing. See NATIONAL
TRANSP6RTATION SAFETY BOARD, ANNUAL REVIEW OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA
(annually, various issues).
15 A "tied-in" product is a product that must be bought when another product
is purchased. For example, automobile safety belts must be purchased, by law,
with the purchase of a new automobile.
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B. The Market Insurance Plan Compared to Other Systems
The prevailing tort liability system has endured harsh
criticism. An insurance based system alleviates the major
problems associated "with the current tort liability system.
1. Expeditious Settlement
The most frequently cited injustice of the current tort
liability system is the uncertain delay it imposes on plain-
tiffs. 56 Many observers allege that the current system cre-
ates incentives for defendents to deliberately delay
judgment because this places emotional pressure on
plaintiffs to settle.5 7 It is an indication of the serious na-
ture of this problem that one commentator 58 wrote ap-
provingly that the Juneau, Alaska, crash of an Alaska
Airlines Boeing 727 on September 4, 197 1,59 took only 30
months to settle.60 The same author regards the tort sys-
tem's settlement of the first widebody case, the Eastern L-
1011 crash in the Everglades on December 29, 1972,61 in
just over a year 62 as "an amazing performance by the ju-
dicial system." 63
These examples are not typical of the current tort sys-
tem. Available evidence indicates mean time from crash
to the termination of litigation of about four years. 64
See, e.g., Kennelly, supra note 1, at 317; Kennedy, supra note 3, at 248; Speiser,
Dynamics of Airline Crash Litigation: What Makes the Cases More?, 43J. AIR L. & COM.
565 (1977); Schwartz, Professor O'Connell's Method for Ending Insult to Injury: Can it
Solve the Air Crash Litigation Dilemma, 41J. AIR L. & COM. 199, 201 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Schwartz].
57 Schwartz, supra note 56, at 202.
-8 Speiser, supra note 56.
See, All 109 Are Killed asJetliner Hits Alaska Mountain, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1971.
0 Speiser, supra note 56, at 573. Even after this time there were still a few cases
outstanding. In re Air Disaster, Juneau, Alaska on Sept. 4, 1971, 350 F. Supp.
1163 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972).
61 See, Airliner Crashes Into Everglades with 167 Aboard, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1972.
62 In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades, 360 F. Supp. 139 (J.P.M.D.L.
1973).
63 Speiser, supra note 56, at 574.
- McDermott, A Plea for the Preservation of the Public's Interest in Multidistrict Litiga-
tion, 37J. AIR L. & COM. 423,426 (1971), finds a mean time from crash to termina-
tion in commercial air crash litigation prior to 1971 of 3 years and 8 months for
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However, some litigation has taken up to a decade to
complete.65
The market insurance plan, by contracting for such con-
tingencies ex ante, rectifies this problem, at least so far as
wrongful death claims are concerned. Standard insurance
industry practice suggests that such claims could normally
be settled in less than a week.66 Injury claims may take
longer due to the difficulty of a definitive medical assess-
ment.67 However, such problems are already dealt with in
other insurance lines and are not new or unsolvable.68
2. More Accurate Determination of Compensation
A second issue arising from the delay of judgement is
the amount of damages plaintiffs can expect to recover if
they prevail. The core determinant of the plaintiffs com-
pensation is lost expected future earnings.69 However,
this measure of the value of life has no basis in economic
theory.7 ° Its only value is as a crude approximation of the
value the plaintiff, or the plaintiffs decedents, would have
placed on the deceased's life.71 Some jurisdictions appear
to acknowledge this by recognizing other grounds for
compensation to injured parties, such as loss of consor-
tium, pre-death pain and suffering, and surviving next of
kin's mental pain and suffering. 72 Nonetheless, when each
case is over, the court has no idea whether it undervalued
or overvalued the deceased's life.
crashes not transferred under multidistrict litigation, and 3 years and 7 months
for transferred cases. Id.
65 Kennelly, supra note 1, at 317.
- See D. BICKELHAuPr, supra note 51, at 834-53.
67 Id. at 843-53.
- Id. at 508-43.
- See R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 134-59.
70 Id. at 149-52; Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach, 79J.
POL. ECON. 687 (1971).
71 This is inferred from the fact that the cost of injury to the plaintiff is inversely
related to the foregone earnings resulting from the injury. Although this infer-
ence assists the court in ranking multiple plaintiffs' claims, it does not fix the cor-
rect level of awards in any individual case.
72 See generally, Kennelly, Aviation - The Need for Uniform Legislation, Seventeenth
Annual Air Law Symposium, Southern Methodist University 21-38 (1983).
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Seven percent of commercial aircraft victims get noth-
ing7" - did they really value their lives at zero dollars?
No-fault proposals are even more arbitrary in valuing life
since they invariably place a ceiling on the maximum al-
lowable recovery for a given injury. 4 This is one of the
two most serious objections to no-fault insurance.75 The
amount allowed in recovery bears no relation to the value
placed on life or limb by the affected party or parties. 6
Since compensation is argued to be a central purpose of
accident law by many legal commentators, 77 no-fault in-
surance has a critical flaw.78
The market insurance plan avoids both the arbitrariness
of no-fault plans and the judicial guesswork of tort liabil-
ity. Consumers contract ex ante for the level of coverage
they want at given market prices. Settlement on policies
is rapid, with the exception of certain personal injury
cases involving questions of medical proof.
79
3. Uniformity of Recoveries
Third, the multidistrict structure of the United States
legal system creates a number of problems. The most se-
. 73 See Schwartz, supra note 56, at 201. There is also the vexing problem for tort
law of the treatment of collateral source compensation. Id. at 203-09.
74 For example, the O'Connell plan permits producers to prespecify a "menu"
of awards for different types of injuries. Once approved by the plan's regulator
these would be binding limits. SeeJ. O'CONNELL, supra note 2.
7- The other objection is discussed infra note 76.
7r The second objection to no-fault insurance is that it creates a serious "moral
hazard" problem. See Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 QJ.. EcoN. 541
(1979). "Moral hazard" is the effect of insurance on the insured's incentives to
take care. Although moral hazard would be serious if enacted for products liabil-
ity in general, this is unlikely for commercial aircraft since producers take care on
behalf of consumers and the small number of firms makes it feasible for the insur-
ance industry to monitor them. Id.
77 See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Schwartz,.Forward
Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435 (1979). 1.
78 The O'Connell proposal actually allows producers to specify which risks are
covered by no-fault insurance, with compensation controlled by a government
agency. This gives producers less incentive to elect no-fault the more difficult it is
for the plaintiff to prove fault. See generally J. O'CONNELL, supra note 2.
79 With respect to the plaintiff showing proof of injury, the market insurance
plan is equal to, but no worse than, the other proposals cited. See supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
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rious of these problems is the arbitrary injustice wrought
by differing treatment of the laws of different jurisdictions
in choice of laws situations.80 Many observers and some
courts argue for uniform legislation.8 Such uniformity
could, at the very least, insure consistent treatment, even
when the specific legal plan can be faulted.
In fact, the problems of multidistrict litigation go
deeper than simply consistent treatment of plaintiffs.
There are also procedural questions created by the insti-
tutions established to deal with multidistrict litigation,
such as plaintiffs' committees. Although the consolida-
tion of cases and formation of a plaintiffs' committee ex-
pedite trial proceedings, it is argued that these devices
can interfere with a plaintiffs rights, as well as lead to
80 Kennelly has described this issue in graphic terms:
In regard to the compensatory damages in wrongful death cases, the
statutes of some states permit damages for the mental pain and suf-
fering of the surviving next of kin. Others do not. Some states per-
mit damages for the loss of society, companionship, services and
consortium to the surviving spouse. Others do not. Some states
permit damages for pre-death pain and suffering. Others do not.
Some states permit damages for loss of inheritance. Others do not.
Some states permit punitive damages in both injury and death cases.
Others deny punitive damages in both injury and death cases, while
still others permit such damages in injury cases, but not in death
cases. Some states allow punitive damages based upon vicarious lia-
bility. Others require proof of egregious conduct of a corporation at
a managerial level. Some states impose an arbitrary amount of dam-
ages for the deaths of single persons without dependents. Others do
not. Some states allow prejudgment interest, i.e., interest from the
date of death. Others do not. Even as to those states which allow
prejudgment interest, the rates of interest vary substantially. There
are other patently indefensible differences among the laws of the
states regarding damages in wrongful death cases. Under Florida
law, for example, which permits damages for mental pain and suffer-
ing of next of kin, an award of $1.8 million in damages was affirmed
for the death of a 16-year-old boy, as a result of the crash of a com-
mercial airliner. Indiana law, on the other hand, limits the damages
in such a'case to funeral expenses and nominal costs for administer-
ing the estate. This is hardly consonant with common sense or with
anyone's concept of justice.
Kennelly, supra note 72, at 23.
81 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois On May 25, 1979, 500
F. Supp. 1044, 1054 (N.D. Il. 1980), afd in part, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Lin v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 U.S. 594 (1981); Kennelly, supra
note 1, at 316-18; Corrigan, supra note 3, at 509-11.
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practical problems such as intra-committee conflict. 82
Moreover, it can be argued that trial of consolidated cases
abrogates the constitutional right to trial by jury8 3 or to
choose one's own attorney.8 4
The dual problem of separate plaintiffs and parallel fed-
eral-state jurisdiction gives rise to final criticism of mul-
tidistrict litigation on practical and equitable grounds. 85
The estoppel implications of separate decisions are still
open, courts having rendered conflicting decisions in the
past.8 6
Despite the problems of multidistrict litigation, the case
for national legislation is far from settled. Other scholars
and trial lawyers argue with equal fervor that federal codi-
fication would usurp states rights,87 although practical
82 See Kennelly, supra note 1, at 294-97, for a description of some of these
problems and how they impinged on Flight 191 litigation.
83 Farrell, Multidistrict Litigation in Aviation Accident Cases, 38J. AIR L. & COM. 159,
167 (1972). But see MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1958)
(district court properly consolidated shareholders' derivative actions under
F.R.C.P. 42(a)).
8 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, commenting on a dispute over the award
of attorneys' fees to district court-designated "lead counsel" out of the fees of
employed counsel, said that the appellants' approach was:
[A] nostalgic luxury no longer available in the hard-pressed federal
courts. It overlooks the much larger interests which arise in litiga-
tion such as this. Each case in the consolidated case was private in
its inception. But the number and cumulative size of the massed
cases created a penumbra of class-type interest on the part of all the
litigants and of public interest on the part of the court and the world
at large. The power of the court must be assayed in this semi-public
contest.
In re Air Crash Disaster At Florida Everglades on December 29, 1972, 549 F.2d
1006, 1012 (5th Cir. 1977).
85 If a case is tried first in state court and results in a defense verdict, the federal
court is not bound to follow that verdict. On the other hand, a state court is
bound by a defense verdict in federal court. Kennelly, supra note 72, at 30.
Compare In re Multidistrict Civil Actions Involving the Air Crash Disaster near
Dayton, Ohio 350, F. Supp. 757, 768 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (subsequent plaintiffs col-
laterally estopped) with Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974) (court of appeals reversed federal district court deci-
sion that subsequent plaintiffs were collaterally estopped).
87 Haskell, Federal Codification of Tort Law: An Unwarranted Usurpation of State Sys-
tems of Common Law, Seventeenth Annual Air Law Symposium, Southern Methodist
University 41-49 (1983).
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and procedural problems also loom large.88
The issue becomes irrelevant under the market insur-
ance plan. Sovereignty is transferred to the individual
consumer, who can decide for himself the answers to the
various issues through his insurance purchase decision.
There is no need for a judge to second-guess plaintiffs'
preferences about such issues as the composition of the
plaintiffs' committee, the extent of pretrial discovery, and
other such matters since these issues are either circum-
vented or their terms are contractually established in
advance.8 9
4. Mulitiple Defendants
Fourth, it is not unusual for aircraft accident litigation
to involve multiple defendants,90 each of whom concedes
that one of them is liable but none of whom will accept
liability. This creates the costly, time-consuming process
of inter-defendant charges and rebuttals during which the
plaintiffs, who patently will eventually recover, must sit
and wait.9 ' In a world of certainty in which all courts
- See, e.g., Dombroff, Against a Federal Law for Air Disaster Litigation, 10 THE BRIEF
30 (1981); Haskell, Federal Regulation Not Needed for Airline Liability, 10 THE BRIEF
26 (1981).
-9 Under the market insurance plan the plaintiff makes the decision about how
much insurance to buy for various types of injuries. Insurance policies are pro-
vided at cost in a perfectly competitive insurance market. See supra notes 51-55 and
accompanying text. By contrast, a no-fault plan, such as the O'Connell plan, sets
arbitrary damage awards that may be widely at variance with consumer demands.
See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 2 and accompanying text; See also supra note 7.
-o Typically, the carrier and the manufacturer are both defendants. In some
cases the FAA is also named as a defendant. For instance, McDonnell Douglas and
American Airlines may both concede that one of them was liable but may not
accept individual liability. Circumstances put the defendants at odds, necessitating
time consuming and expensive plaintiff discovery proceedings.
91 To quote Kennelly:
There are many aviation cases in which the liability of at least one of
the defendants is unquestionable. In other words, the facts in the
case are such that no court would permit a defense verdict in favor
of all defendants. The plaintiffs have no interest in how the defend-
ants' liabilities are allocated. The only genuine liability issue in most
commercial accident cases involves the extent of the liability of the
various defendants in terms of their comparative negligence vis-a-vis
one another.
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awarded the correct amount of prejudgment interest and
plaintiffs could borrow without cost in the capital market
at the same implied rate,92 inter-defendant squabbles
would not impose any costs on plaintiffs. However, the
present tort system itself creates uncertainty about the
length of time until judgment, which prevents plaintiffs
from borrowing in the capital markets at a rate compara-
ble to the rate awarded in prejudgment interest. An in-
surance system does not assign liability ex post, thus
circumventing problems.
5. Administrative Costs
Finally, a comparison of tort liability as it presently ex-
ists with the insurance proposal explained above must ad-
dress the relative administrative costs of the two
systems. 93 If an insurance system is too costly to operate,
then its other advantages are irrelevant. The approximate
cost of operating an insurance system 94 can be estimated
from the costs of similar, pre-existing types of insurance,
such as automobile or personal accident insurance.
Using these figures, a reasonable estimate of such ad-
ministrative costs is five to ten percent of each premium
dollar.9 5 By contrast, evidence on the proportion of tort
liability awards that ultimately reach plaintiffs in aircraft
accident cases indicates that plaintiffs receive only fifteen
to twenty percent of the total amount spent in insuring,
Kennelly, supra note 72, at 31.
92 If capital markets operated without cost, then plaintiffs expecting damage
awards in the future would be able to borrow the expected present value of the
award at the time of injury and repay the loan when the award was received. The
point is that the prospect of a damages award and its timing is so uncertain under
the existing tort system as to make it very poor loan collateral. For the theory of
competitive capital markets, see generally E. FAMA & M. MILLER, THE THEORY OF
FINANCE (1972).
93 To see the importance of administrative costs to the evaluation of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms, see G. CALABRESI, supra note 77.
- Examples of the costs of operating an insurance system are the insurer's
overhead costs and settlement expenses.
95 See D. BICKELHAUrr, supra note 51.
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defending, and paying claims under the current system.9 6
Contingent attorneys' fees in some jurisdictions reach as
high as fifty percent of awards. 7 Extended discussion has
not resulted in proposals that would make the tort system
more administratively efficient.
C. Is Uniform Legislation the Answer?
Proposals for uniform legislation, whether by the Na-
tional Commissioners on Uniform State Laws or through
federal legislation, deserve separate attention since they
are the most likely reform to result from the present dis-
satisfaction.9 8 Regardless of which method is chosen, the
benefits of a uniform reform should not be overstated.
Uniform legislation will do what its name suggests, unify
some fifty disparate systems of law, but it will not resolve
all the problems attributed to existing aircraft law. Uni-
form can mean uniformly wrong. If recently proposed
legislation is any guide, many existing problems will per-
sist and some new ones will be created as well.99
There is little reason to believe that the National Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws will be more success-
ful, since the multijurisdictional nature of the United
States tort system is not the basic problem. Despite the
heated emotions inevitably generated by proposals to
supplant state with federal jurisdiction, the issue is a red
herring. Although uniform legislation could equalize dam-
age awards, resolve parallel litigation inconsistencies, and
possibly shorten the delay from crash to resolution, the re-
mainder of the inequities ascribed to state jurisdiction
would go unaddressed. Multidefendant disputes would
Martin, The Manufacturer's View of "No-Fault", 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 223, 234
(1975).
97 Schwartz, supra note.56 at 201.
98 Various bills to enact uniform legislation have advanced further in Congress
than have other types of proposals, and a uniform products liability law appears to
be near passage. See Lamar, Proposed Federal Legislation Affecting Products Laibility and
Aviation Law, Seventeenth Annual Air Law Symposium, Southern Methodist Uni-
versity, 3-19 (1983)[hereinafter cited as Lamar].
- See Lamar, supra note 98, at 5-8, and Kennelly, supra note 1, at 293-97, for a
description and general assessment of proposed and existing legislation.
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still exist, questions would still surround the composition
of plaintiffs' committees, and the size of awards would still
be a judicial guess as to the worth of a particular plaintiff's
life. If a good system, of uniform legislation were insti-
tuted tomorrow, legal debate about many problems we
experience now would begin immediately.
V. CONCLUSION
This catalog of the shortcomings of the present aircraft
litigation system and the comparison of its performance
with the proposed insurance based system points to a
clear conclusion. The insurance proposal is immune from
the major criticisms of the current tort system. The un-
derlying reason is that tort liability is a system best suited
to resolving conflicts between parties which are apart. On
the other hand, insurance is an example of contract be-
tween parties who interact in advance. Mass air travel, for
all of the superficial indications that it involves interac-
tions between strangers, is closer to a contractual rela-
tionship than is widely believed.
The evidence presented earlier' 00 showing stock price
reactions to aircraft accidents indicates market responses
to perceived new information and contradicts the strict
"market failure" view required for efficient strict liabil-
ity. 10 1 Because such clear evidence of market response
was not previously available, it is not altogether surprising
that most observers have responded to failings in the
present structure of aircraft accident law with proposals
that exclude an effective role for consumer choice.10 2
There is no need to settle for a second-rate system
when institutions already exist to institute a superior pro-
gram. The insurance industry insures far more compli-
cated risks than commercial air carriers, 10 and consumers
engage in far more complicated transactions than travel
-o See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
10, See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
102 See generally supra note 3.
103 For example, commercial insurance for oil shipments through the Straits of
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insurance.04 A carefully structured insurance system
would transfer the locus of decision-making authority to
the consumer and, by so doing, eliminate the major
problems of tort liability. It is not possible or necessaryto
claim that an insurance system would work perfectly nor
have I made such a suggestion. The point is that the pres-
ent system is inadequate and proposed reforms do not ad-
dress the genesis of the problems. An insurance system
goes to the heart of the issue - the locus of decision-mak-
ing authority - and thereby permits participants to take
safety precautions and establish optimal compensation
levels.
Hormuz or the loss on major commercial ventures are more complicated risks
than those risks associated with commercial air carriers.
- Compare the simple decisions involved in travel insurance with the con-




Methodology for Computing the Forecast Errors
Define Pi, = price of security i in period (day) t.
Di, = dividend of security i in period (day)
t.
Pit - Pi1 + Di,
Then Ri, = Pi, - Pit - I + D = the return on
Pit- 1 security in the
period (day) t
Rm, = return on the market portfolio in
period (day) t.
The expected return on security i in period t is assumed
to behave according to the "market model."'
Rit = a + 13Rmt + Eit (1)
The measure of market returns used in both studies
cited in the test is the CRSP (Center for Research in Se-
curity Prices) equally-weighted index of all NYSE and
AMEX stocks. Equation 1 can be used to estimate the co-
efficients (a, 13) over a time period outside the event pe-
riod^ when a crash occurred. The predicted coefficients
(x, 13) are then used to obtain predicted returns (RjO on
stock i during the event period. Viz:
lRit = 6 + ORmt (2)
Under the alternative hypothesis of reputation effects,
the forecast error
A^
eit = Rit- Ri, (3)
from equation (2) is negative.
Summing across j crashes (j = 1,...,i,...,n) we can obtain
e-,, the mean forecast error for each period t:
j=n f
e = 1 -. (4)j=1 n
See Sharpe, A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis, 9 Management Science 277
(1963).
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Summing'et from the event date T + 29 obtains the
cumulative mean forecast error CMFE:
T+29
CMFE = eit. (5)
t=T
CMFE is reported in Figure 1 (the large sample of
crashes) and Figure 2 (the Chicago DC-10 crash). The t-
statistics reported in the text are valid if ej, is normally
distributed. Refer to the original papers Products Reputa-
tion and Market Forces for full details of the statistical tests
and econometric checks conducted in the course of the
analysis.
